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Work on seed systems has shown how pivotal markets are for helping smallholder farmers access seed in 
both normal and stress periods. This review focuses on the current and future potential use of markets to 
support smallholder farmer seed security in emergency and chronic stress contexts. The first objective is to 
review and categorize past experience across different types of market-oriented interventions and the second 
objective is to explore possible approaches for moving better practices forward, recognizing both the enablers 
and barriers for doing so. 
 
The discussion and findings are based on a portfolio of ten cases that were identified as having a supply-side 
focus. The cases were drawn from eight countries (Afghanistan, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Zambia) and included nine crops (common beans, groundnuts, maize, millet, potato, soya, 
sorghum, sweet potato, and wheat). We used the seed security conceptual framework and its parameters of 
seed access, availability, and seed quality, and then we added “information” as a fourth parameter to 
characterize these market-based seed interventions and identify them as either formal or informal seed sector. 
A complementary review on cash transfers for seed security in humanitarian settings assessed the demand 
side of market-led seed security interventions in emergency contexts (Keane et al., 2019).1 
 
This review found that many of the selected cases included a supply side, market-led support intervention in 
the formal sector with the goal to ensure availability of modern varieties. Seed suppliers of varied types were 
contracted to supply or produce seed—which was subsequently bought back by governments or NGOs and 
then given to farmers for free or at a deep discount. This type of intervention occurred especially in contexts 
deemed as chronically seed insecure, and this practice (‘contract multiplication’—buy back, give free) was 
frequently repetitive (2-3 consecutive years or more). A variant of formal sector market-led support involved 
giving credit to agro-dealers who then procured and sold seed directly but were also supported with an 
additional demand side subsidy in the form of seed vouchers redeemable at the agro-dealers for up to 50% of 
their seed value. This variant had elements of sustainability by linking relief to development in that the 
customer base directly interfaced with the market-led seed supplier (agro-dealer). 
 
Market-led support initiatives on the supply side within the informal seed sector are more unknown. This 
review could not document a single case where supply-side support was provided to the informal seed sector 
to encourage market-led seed security for smallholder farmers in emergency and/or chronic stress contexts. 
While there were anecdotes of grants supporting traders to improve the quality of their seed in emergency 
and chronic stress contexts, we were not able to specifically identify those cases and gather supporting 
documentation.  
 
Understanding seed market (both formal and informal seed sectors) functioning during stress periods is a 
critical precursor to moving forward and expanding market-led supply-side interventions which address seed 
security for smallholder farmers. While detailed seed market analysis might be a challenge to carry out in the 
context of an emergency response where there may be time and/or security constraints, tools do exist to 
address this gap and they can be employed quickly if accompanied by technical expertise. A second precursor 
is to build in much more data collection to facilitate collaborative learning and socializing of best practices 
around what is actually being tested and implemented in terms of market-led approaches to address seed 
security for smallholder farmers. While we are grateful for the cases identified and the information and 
insights generously shared, both donors and implementors will benefit from more documentation of the 
actual process, the immediate results, and the medium-term impacts of market-led seed system interventions. 
Program monitoring and evaluation should be more oriented to assessing market-based outcomes like crop 
and varietal diversity, farmer choice, competition among seed market suppliers, and expanding a sustainable 
customer base.  
 
 




There is a good deal more work to do in testing and refining market-led approaches to address seed security 
for smallholder farmers in emergency and chronic stress contexts. Both donors and implementors would 
benefit from a more entrepreneurial and dynamic approach which leverages existing market actors (informal 



























Feed the Future Global Supporting Seed Systems for Development activity (S34D) is a five-year Leader with 
Associates Cooperative Agreement Award, funded by the Feed the Future Initiative through the Bureau for 
Resilience and Food Security (RFS) and by USAID through the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA). Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is leading this consortium with support from partners that include: 
Agri Experience, ABC-PABRA, IFDC, Opportunity International (OI) and Purdue University. S34D’s Life 
of Activity (LOA) runs from August 2018 through August 2023. The overarching goal of S34D is to improve 
the functioning of national seed sectors in focus countries in an inclusive manner—this ‘inclusive’ approach 
aims to support all farmers, including women farmers and youth. S34D aims to meet the activity goals by 
increasing the capacity of each of the seed systems to sustainably offer quality, affordable seeds of a range of 
crops (Objective 1) and increasing collaboration and coordination among all seed systems actors and actions 
(Objective 2). 
This activity is unique in that the overall strategy proposes to generate a broader view and integration of the 
seed systems, with Objective 1 working across formal, informal and emergency seed sectors; and, Objective 
2 placing emphasis on the interactions and synergies among the three systems. This integrated approach is 
further strengthened by cross-cutting intermediate results that seek to improve policies and practices that 
support pluralistic seed systems, rather than focusing on individual parts of each system. An important aspect 
of the activity is to gain a better understanding about how seed systems interact and where there may be 
positive or negative market interactions. In the case of detrimental actions, S34D intends to develop 
interventions to address market distortions.  
Market-led approaches in humanitarian assistance are gaining recognition, with the aid sector showing an 
increased recognition of the potential importance of both the formal private sector and more informal 
markets as a means to deliver assistance. Despite this growing interest in the humanitarian community to 
work with a range of markets, there seems to be a relative lack of in-depth market analysis to guide 
intervention design or to assess market performance and impact — on markets or beneficiaries — after an 
intervention. “Market outcomes are a significant determinant of livelihood outcomes, and so understanding how crises affect 
markets and market relations is critical to understanding livelihoods, and both development and humanitarian outcomes” 
(Levine, 2017). 
This review focuses on the current and future potential use of markets to support smallholder farmer seed 
security in emergency and chronic stress contexts. This review emphasizes the supply side in market-led seed 
security response support (to help render quality seed available and accessible to farmers in stress periods). A 
complementary review has analyzed the demand side and user issues linked to humanitarian market-led seed 
security response (Keane et al., 2019).2 
  
 
2 Keane, Jules, Dina Brick and Louise Sperling. 2019. Study on cash transfers for seed security in humanitarian settings. A Feed 





A brief review of field responses 
While donor seed investments have primarily focused on strengthening the formal sector, seed-specific 
evidence shows that the informal sector remains the core for farmer seed acquisition, especially in Africa. A 
data set of 10,000+ discrete farmer observations across multiple crops and countries in Africa reveals that 
farmers access 90% of their seed from informal systems, with over 50% of that sourced from local markets 
and 55% of that seed paid for in cash (McGuire and Sperling, 2016).3 Such field-based evidence illustrates 
that smallholder farmers are making seed investments themselves and that this suggests a broader scope for 
supporting both formal and informal market sectors in normal and stress periods (with the latter divided here 
between acute and chronic stress contexts). 
Approaches to link humanitarian aid and market support to address seed security constraints has expanded 
significantly over the last two decades. These advances are most evident if focused on the client or demand 
side. To help farmers access seed during stress, a range of assistance approaches have been developed and 
implemented, such as giving farmer beneficiaries vouchers variously tied to seed fairs, seed producers or agro-
dealers and even giving farmer beneficiaries cash directly for their essential seed buying (Keane et al, 2019; 
CRS, 2017; Mercy Corps, 2016). The use of seed vouchers, coupled with fairs (SV+F), has particularly 
increased in humanitarian practice since around 2000. Seed vouchers & fairs were developed based on the 
idea of working with local seed traders and seed producers under conditions where seed was available 
(Remington et al, 2002). The use of SV+F expanded very rapidly — to the extent that a meta-analysis of their 
scope and effectiveness was completed in 2005 in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and the Gambia (see Bramel and 
Remington, 2005, for country specific details). Voucher-based approaches more generally (with or without 
fairs) have been tied to a range of providers, e.g., redeemable with seed producers (CIAT et al., 2010) or agro-
dealers (Mercy Corps, 2016). Such a voucher-based strategy might be usefully categorized by the term ‘smart 
subsidy.’ In one review, the main characteristics of ‘smart seed subsidies’ were described as follows: they 
targeted specific farmers, they were market-based, and they included an exit strategy.4 
An overriding issue to raise around these demand-side interventions is how the supply side has been shaped 
(or restricted)—i.e. what is ultimately put on offer for farmers to access with vouchers or cash through these 
demand-side interventions. It is important to note that along with the expansion in access methods has come 
an increased level of control on the seed sellers (size, location, legal status, open or closed tender processes) 
and seed types (crops, varieties, quality) allowed in these programs. Seed assistance programs with a market-
oriented seed access component often operate as a highly regulated market, where local and existing seed 
traders are often not able to participate, and where locally-available and farmer-preferred crops and varieties 
may be purposefully excluded.5 For example, agro-dealers may not be at liberty to source crops and varieties 
on their own, and farmers may not have many choices in terms of where they can redeem a seed voucher. 
Another common example is the program requirement for the exclusive use of certified seed where the 
systems and protocols for certification do not exist and/or are irregularly applied. 
 
3 The data set also contained information on use of intermediary or integrated seed sources (that variously span the formal and 
informal sectors) and include entities such as farmer cooperatives or community-based seed producers. Most seed planted by 
farmers comes from their own stocks or from neighbors, friends, and family. Seed sourced in local markets that was not 
purchased with cash was sourced through bartering.  
4 Baltzer and Hansen evaluated input (principally seed & fertilizer) subsidy programs in Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, and Tanzania 
and concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to indicate what some of the long-term impacts of these programs are on 
seed systems. The value for money proposition that smart subsidy agricultural inputs programs are a good investment, an upfront 
justification for these programs, was not evident from their review. They concluded that these programs are costly and in-
effective because the benefits often accrue to the politically connected and not to the rural poor; that the symptoms of low input 
use are the focus of investment rather than the disease of market failure and low farmer demand for inputs; and that these 
programs created an artificial market and that market sustainability and exit strategies were not put in place (Baltzer and Hansen, 
2012). 




Supporting formal or informal markets? 
Humanitarian aid support on the supply side has been less well pursued—hence this review to refine our 
knowledge and practice further. We acknowledge from the outset that the choice to support either formal 
markets and/or informal markets gives cause for fundamental reflection. 
The formal private sector role in seed is growing in the developing world, particularly in Africa, but the sector 
continues to have limited results in serving smallholder farmers at scale (total volume and geographical 
coverage), breadth (diverse crops and varieties), and depth (diversity of goods and services). The African Seed 
Access Index (TASAI), launched in 2015, has funded 12+ studies to assess farmer access to seed from the 
formal sector.6 Among TASAI’s key findings are that the formal private seed sector is growing in sub-Saharan 
Africa – mainly in maize – but maize dominates public crop breeding in terms of human and financial 
resources; and across the main food crops, old varieties persist despite widespread introductions of new 
varieties (Mabaya and Mugogoua, 2017). 
Informal markets are rarely a point of focus for market-based interventions, despite the fact that they are a 
major source of farmers’ seed across a broad range of crops and they play a critical role in promoting genetic 
diversity. The use of local markets for seed varies by income; but typically, poor farmers are more likely to 
consistently rely on local markets to access both seed for planting and to access new germplasm. There are 
multiple reasons why informal markets do not receive support from the public sector (government or 
research programs) such as a lack of appreciation of the importance of such markets for seed; a perceived 
challenge of distinguishing between grain and seed in local markets and, hence, compromising quality; or fear 
that working with informal market participants undermines (i.e. competes with) the formal sector where most 
public and private sector investment is based (see Sperling and McGuire, 2010). 
Wherever the support is provided, whether to formal and/or informal markets, market-based approaches 
should aim to promote choice in terms of crops, varieties, and competition among suppliers and should not 
burden smallholder farmers with high costs to access seed.7 
Finally, to set the stage, we raise the issue of negative as well as positive impacts when supporting markets. 
Humanitarian aid, even when the aid is intended to support markets, can have negative and positive outcomes 
on both the supply and demand side. On the supply side for example, tender processes intended to be open 
and transparent can prevent small traders and suppliers from participating because they are not ‘pre-qualified’, 
cannot meet the tender volume, do not have access to credit, or they may lack representation in the capital 
city where the tender is floated. On the demand side for example, free or discounted seed may disrupt and 
dis-incentivize existing suppliers and have knock on effects on credit relationships when existing market 
actors are supplanted by project-supported market actors. 
The preceding discussion has sketched some of the broad developments and issues surrounding market-led 
seed interventions, especially in humanitarian practice, as well as initial thinking on the use of formal and 
informal markets linked to seed system support. Some of these market-oriented reflections can also be 
applicable to longer term development-oriented seed programs. In this vein, it could be useful to think about 
strategies to link relief to development perspectives and create more robust seed markets that can span 
emergency, chronic stress and developmental contexts. 
 
6 The TASAI index assesses the performance of the top four grain and legume crops in each country across five categories: 
Research and Development, Industry Competitiveness, Seed Policy and Regulations, Institutional Support, and Service to 
Smallholder Farmers (https://tasai.org/publications/). 
7 Farming households need seeds for a range of crop varieties that meet their local needs and tastes and are adapted to local agro-
ecological and climatic conditions. It bears emphasis that Quality seed is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustainable 
production. Strategies to assist smallholder farmers to improve their livelihoods will require addressing many of these elements in 





Before reviewing the methods and then specific cases, we share the initial conceptual framework which 
shaped case selection and subsequent analysis. 
As defined in humanitarian practice, seed security has three basic features or building blocks. The Seed 
Security Framework (SSF) outlines the fundamental elements as: seed must be available, farmers need to be 
able to access it, and the seed quality must be sufficient to promote healthy seed system functioning 
(Remington, et al., 2002). 
From the farming community perspective, seed availability is defined narrowly as whether sufficient quantity of 
seed of target crops is present within reasonable proximity (spatial availability) and in time for critical sowing 
periods (temporal availability). Seed access largely depends upon the assets of the farmer or household in 
question: whether they have the cash (financial capital) or social networks (social capital) to purchase or barter 
for seed. Seed quality includes two broad aspects: seed quality per se, and variety quality. Seed quality consists 
of physical, physiological and sanitary attributes (such as the germination rate, and the absence or presence of 
disease, stones, sand, broken seed or weeds). Variety quality consists of genetic attributes, such as plant type, 
duration of growth cycle, seed color and shape, palatability and so on (Sperling, 2008). In a stress situation, it 
is very rare to have major constraints in all three seed security features at the same time. The challenge is to 
diagnose the real problem and then to target alleviating actions. Note in the table below we have added a seed 
security feature on information. This encompasses two-way information systems: information to farmers and 
feedback from farmers8. It is our view that all the features – availability, access and quality – should have an 
integrated information component. 
Importantly, these seed security parameters are often described using the client or farmers (demand side) as 
the focal point: Is seed available to farmers locally; is it accessible; and is the quality what farmers want and 
need? This review tries to shift the analyses also to the supply side, and specifically to markets. Given a focus 
on market-led support (rather than direct client-centered responses), what kinds of interventions could 
enhance the availability, accessibility and quality of market functioning to serve farmers? Further, recognizing 
the diverse sets of markets, we divided conceptual thinking into possible support initiatives to formal markets 
and to informal market functioning. As a shorthand, the major actors in formal markets might be research 
centers, seed parastatals and private sector companies. Informal markets might include farmer sellers, 
collectors, brokers and traders working at difference scales (Sperling and McGuire, 2010). 
Table 1 presents our initial brainstorming attempts on seed security-linked possible interventions. It includes 
some responses actually in practice, as well as a large range of those not yet attempted (or for which we could 
not locate documentation).9 
For ease of interpretation, we added a column (A) containing the more well-known client focused responses 
(and these are discussed in Keane et al., 2019). It is column B—on actual or potential market-led responses on 
the supply side—that is the focus of this review and exploration. The description of specific case studies 
(page 12) will shed light on which types of support have been tested or implemented at scale—and some of 
the actual effects. 
 
8 Product profiles are gaining more traction and several donors (USAID, Bill & Melina Gates Foundation) are encouraging more 
use of a product profile framework (crop and variety profiles) and more demand-driven approaches to breeding as means to promote 
more two-way information from farmers to breeders, seed producers, and seed companies. 
9 This list of current and possible interventions is probably not exhaustive. We welcome hearing from and learning from readers 




Table 1. Characterizing market-based seed interventions tied to specific seed security problems10 





Market-based intervention (supply) 
Formal sector Informal seed sector 
Availability Link farmers to sources of stress 
tolerant crops and varieties (may 
give cash?)  
 
Cross-cuts with variety quality and 
information systems) 
Transport vouchers/cash 
to traders (to move 
supplies to remote areas- 





Transport vouchers/cash to traders (to 
move supplies to remote areas—both 
availability and access) 
 
Advocacy for relaxed quality restrictions- 
allowing for more supplies 
 
Capital advances to traders/loans.;  
Access Conditional cash  
Unconditional cash  
Cash plus Vouchers 
Conditional seed (seed for work?) 
Client transport subsidies 
Transport vouchers to 
formal sellers (to move 
supplies to remote areas- 
- under both availability 
and access) 
 
Incentives to companies 
to pack small (reduce 
price) 
Transport vouchers to traders (to move 
supplies to remote areas-- both 
availability and access) 
 
Digital payment to traders (access and 
availability) 
 








• Crop, Variety, 
Quality 
Cash for storage 
purchases/improvements 
 
Cash tied to agro-dealers (for 
crops/varieties farmers know) 
 Work with traders to improve seed (and 
grain) storage facilities e.g., training on 
quality parameters for seed and grain 
storage; encourage use of seed/ grain 
moisture meters and hermetic storage 
containers (PICS).  
Cash tied to agro-dealers (for 
crops/varieties new/introduced). 
 
Cash tied to improvements such as 
seed dressing. 
 
Reduce barriers to new variety 
access, multiplication, certification, 
marketing, finance, etc. 
  Work with traders to move new varieties 
(linked to information systems) 
(skill enhancement) 
 
Work with traders to distinguish among 





• Information to 
farmers 
• Feedback from 
farmers 
Cash plus in kind info.  
Scratch cards/ digital vouchers to 
facilitate tracking purchase data.    
More use of product (crop and 
variety) profiles for farmers,  
researchers. and seed companies. 
 Information systems to help farmers 
learn about stress-tolerant varieties/ 
crops (cash for radio 
announcements/SMS) 
 
Information systems to train traders. 
 
10 (Sperling, 2019). Note: many of these parameters may overlap; for example, availability of stress tolerant crops or 






This review was desk-based. No new fieldwork or data collection was carried-out. Potential cases were 
identified by reaching out to seed system researchers, donors, and NGOs and soliciting actual examples of 
market-based seed support on the supply side in the context of emergency or chronic stress. Organizations 
were approached that had some field experience in seed system support and that could draw on experiences 
of multiple countries and multiple years. Some of those contacted included CGIAR (ICRISAT, CIP), FAO 
headquarters and country staff, Wageningen University & Research, and NGOs (Mercy Corps, Catholic 
Relief Services, Lutheran World Relief). Publicly accessible databases of donors (e.g. USAID/OFDA) were 
also reviewed. All organizations expressed significant interest in the subject matter. 
The search aimed for a case portfolio centered in either the formal or informal seed sector (or both) and that 
addressed diverse seed security parameters. Case identification proved more challenging than expected. 
Sometimes relevant cases could not be recalled with the detailed required; for example, one could find general 
summaries of seed activities, but, despite lengthy agricultural program evaluation documents (e.g. 100 pages), 
only scant discussions of the technical seed program details (maybe a 2-page analysis) were available. Also, 
field staff working on the programs moved to other programs or organizations—or while implementing, 
many were not conversant with seed specific issues. Multiple rounds of emails, phone interviews, Skype calls, 
etc., worked to fill in some gaps and to build more comprehensive descriptions of what may have unrolled on 
the ground and around decision-making more generally. 
Ultimately ten cases have been identified as being relevant to this market-led review of seed security work. 
They are drawn from eight countries (Afghanistan, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Zambia) and include nine crops (common beans, groundnuts, maize, millet, potato, soya, sorghum, sweet 
potato, and wheat). The cases span from the mid-2000’s in Afghanistan to current cases being implemented 





CASE DESCRIPTIONS & BROAD FINDINGS 
Each of the cases included in this review is briefly described below. For each case, the salient features are 
described in a vignette and then case-specific reflections are presented immediately after. The complexity of 
each case, and well as the diversity of the set in total, suggest that this immediate-feedback format is a logical 
option. Our aim in providing immediate feedback (‘reflections’) is not to criticize programs but rather to 
stimulate future thinking linked to program design and practice by sharing lessons learned. 
Annex I (Catalogue of Cases) presents more detail on each case and may be useful for seed system specialists. 
The sources for the case information are listed in Annex II. 
1. Government Backed Sweet Potato Vine Markets in Rwanda. 2017, trigger stress: drought. 
Over the past few years, the government of Rwanda has spent approximately $400,000 annually on the 
purchase of sweet potato vines for smallholder farmers suffering from recurrent drought. The sweet potato 
vine materials have been purchased through a competitive market-based tender process that is managed 
centrally and distributed for free to beneficiary farmers. These government tenders are often won by seed 
trader intermediaries and sometimes by vine producers. Most of the vines are procured from a group of 79 
decentralized sweet potato vine multipliers who are supported technically by the International Potato Center 
(CIP). The 79 decentralized vine multipliers grow both orange flesh (high vitamin A variety) and white flesh 
(traditional style) varieties. 
These vine multipliers sell most of their vine to institutional buyers, primarily the Government of Rwanda or 
intermediaries selling to the Government of Rwanda. The vine procurement process is centralized and makes 
it difficult for vine multipliers to participate as direct bidders. That said, an estimated one third of their 
production is sold directly to farmers through organized roadside markets. Several NGOs involved in root 
production and nutrition activities are also important institutional buyers. 
Seed inspection for vine producers selling to the Rwandan government or to intermediaries selling to the 
Rwandan government is not rigorously followed. Payment to vine producers participating in the Government 
tenders is frequently delayed. The decentralized vine multipliers supported by CIP are inspected by the 
national seed service and receive certificates, but there are other vine producers in Rwanda who do not have 
certificates yet find a way to sell into these institutional vine markets. The main seed quality issue for sweet 
potato planting material revolves around poor tolerance to pest and disease. 
Reflections 
Maintaining sweet potato vines in the dry season is a recurrent challenge. Competitive and centralized seed 
tender and distribution processes may not deliver market benefit to farmers or to seed producers. Such 
centralized tenders may be the least expensive option but may not provide sufficient seed choice to farmers 
or encourage seed producers to meet the seed quality standards which farmers demand. Seed quality may be 
compromised due to a limited feed-back loop between the seed user and seed producer. 
More decentralized procurement processes and small lot tendering can encourage smaller seed producers to 
participate. By default, large tenders lock out small producers. Partial up-front funding from the Rwandan 
government or NGO projects to support vine production—combined with performance contracts for seed 
producers—could reduce the risk for the vine producer while maintaining a market-based incentive structure. 
A relief to development transition can be facilitated by mapping the existing sweet potato seed system to 
illustrate how male and female farmers access sweet potato planting materials and to identify more sustainable 





2. Legume Seed Grower Association selling into Zambia’s maize focused seed markets, 
through the government-sponsored input programs. 2011-present, trigger stress: low 
productivity and need for crop diversification. 
Sanikuno seed producer group is comprised of 40 farmers. Since 2011, the group has produced legume seed 
of common beans, soybean, and groundnuts. In 2018, they produced an estimated 14 MT and their most 
important client is AFRISEED, an institutional buyer that is the primary legume supplier to the Zambian 
government-backed agricultural input programs. Sanikuno does not have a guaranteed market and, each year, 
they make production decisions based on previous year sales and their forecasts for the upcoming year. For 
several years, they did not sell into the institutional seed markets because they did not pass inspection. 
Sanikuno has a very good working relationship with the national legume program and participates regularly in 
varietal demonstration trials for new legume varieties. Sanikuno seed fields are inspected annually by the 
national seed inspectorate (SCCI), and there have been several times when the group has failed such seed 
quality reviews. When Sanikuno fails formal inspection, they cannot sell their seed to the buyers that sell to 
the government agricultural input program, and they sell seed on the local grain market. Sanikuno wants to 
expand their sales channels. 
Over the last decade, the Zambian government has allocated more than 50% of the agriculture budget to 
input programs and helping farmers with inputs is a government priority. The government agricultural input 
program purchases and disseminates inputs — primarily hybrid maize seed and fertilizer — through 
centralized procurement and dissemination through agro-dealers. The program has evolved over the last few 
years to reduce centralized procurement of hybrid maize and to encourage agro-dealers to buy directly from 
hybrid maize seed companies. A similar decentralization of the procurement process for legume seed has yet 
to take place. 
Encouraging legume production and diversification out of maize has been an emerging policy of the Zambian 
government since 2012, and legume seed has increasingly been centrally procured under the Zambian 
government input programs. Agro-dealers in Zambia participating in the government input program by 
stocking and disseminating maize and fertilizer do not purchase legume seed directly from seed producers. 
Rather, legume seed made available to farmers through the government input programs is centrally procured 
and made available for free to farmers. This intervention involves only modern varieties that are registered in 
the national seed catalogue. Varieties that are not in the national catalogue, even if there is big market interest 
for these, are not included. 
Reflections 
Seed markets dominated by a single buyer are less likely to promote crop and varietal diversity. Centralized 
procurement may be easier to administer but it does not necessarily foster market- based competition for 
seed quality, equitable access to seed markets for seed producers, or choice of varieties by farmers. 
One important aspect of seed quality—providing adapted crops and varieties which meet the interests and 
need of male and female farmers—cannot be addressed exclusively by the seed inspectorate processes. To 
address legume seed quality issues that relate to appropriate crops and varieties—so as to promote diversity 
and respond to farmer demand—requires seed production to be more decentralized such that seed producers 
sell into the region, communities, and agro-ecologies where the seed is produced. Seed producer groups may 
be better positioned to identify new seed sales opportunities if they are linked with national research and 
extension systems to access new germplasm and conduct demonstration trials in local areas. 
3. Quality Declared Seed for Potato and Sweet Potato in Ethiopia. 2016 onwards, trigger stress: 
drought. 
Drought-affected farmers in two regions of the country— Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' 
Region (SNNPR) and Amhara—have been provided with quality planting material of potato and sweet 




program has been running since 2016, is supported by USAID/OFDA, and is managed by the International 
Potato Center (CIP), which works mainly with seed producer groups and cooperatives which were established 
from earlier funded projects, many of which were funded by USAID. Training on seed production and 
management is provided periodically to seed producers. Farmers and development agents are also trained on 
modern seed storage methods—diffused light stores for potato and the triple S method (sand, storage, 
sprouting) for sweet potato - to help farmers be more effective managers of potato and sweet potato planting 
material. 
All seed procured by the program is inspected under the authority of the Regional Bureau of Agriculture 
using quality declared seed (QDS) standards which were officially endorsed by the Ethiopian government in 
2015 for potato and in 2016 for sweet potato. CIP has been working with the Ethiopian Institute of 
Agricultural Research (EIAR) on QDS standards since 2011. All seed is procured through a competitive 
bidding process open to the registered seed producers having a valid quarantine license that is renewed 
annually. The fields of all winning bids are inspected to ensure quality control and that the volume proposed 
per the bid can be met in practice. All purchases of planting material from seed produced under these 
programs is done through CIP with supply contracts over $20,000 requiring a CIP regional signatory and with 
supply contracts over $50,000 requiring a CIP headquarters signatory.  
Procurement of seed for this emergency project was valued at $200,000 in 2019, and it is estimated that more 
than 90% of all seed will be purchased by institutions and programs and provided to farmers for free. 
Reflections 
Governments are a major institutional buyer and as a such an important partner in promoting more 
sustainable and market-oriented seed interventions in the context of emergency and chronic stress. However, 
large market-led seed supply contracts, based on competitive but restrictive tender processes, may be cost 
effective but can also discourage the emergence of more decentralized and competitive seed production and 
seed marketing enterprises. This is even more likely to occur where seed is being provided for free and is not 
paid for by the seed users. 
Chronic stress contexts are often framed as an emergency context in order to justify an acute one-off 
investment or short-term response. When this occurs repetitively, it can result in a legacy of inefficient seed 
producers who are not responsive to the actual needs of farmers. This is even more likely to occur where seed 
is being provided for free and is not paid for by the seed users. 
For potato seed there may be clear scope for more market-led sustainable commercial seed production: 
farmer demand and willingness to pay for clean potato seed has been well established in many different 
countries and contexts. Market-led approaches require linking producers to farmers as seed buyers as 
opposed to free recipients of planting material. 
4. Certified Seed Fairs in the Complex Humanitarian Crisis of Eastern DRC. 2017-2019, trigger 
stress: ongoing conflict resulting in market disruption and population displacement. 
Eastern DRC has faced a series of complex humanitarian crises which have led to widescale internal 
displacement and the disruption of markets due to insecurity. Despite the challenges, local markets still 
function and can be supported to help smallholder farmers access seed. The Center for Rural Development 
in Kibututu (CEDERU) is a well-established faith based Congolese NGO based in North Kivu, Eastern 
DRC. They have partnered on dozens of agricultural projects over the past two decades. From 2017-2019, 
they carried out three sets of seed fairs in Eastern DRC which served in total more than 8,000 farming 
households in three different locations and for three different organizations: FAO, Oxfam, and Samaritan’s 
Purse. In all of the seed fairs, the seed traders that participated in the fair were selected following an open 
tender process overseen by the national seed inspectorate (SENASEM - Service Nationale de Semences) and 





The seed fairs were intended to encourage market participation and to help seed insecure farmers to access 
quality seed through the market forum of a fair. Two of the three sets of fairs were organized as modified 
distributions whereby farmers received a fixed amount of seed in exchange for a voucher. A very limited 
number of seed traders participated in the fairs and few seed producers participated directly. For the FAO 
supported fairs, seed traders were requested to source seed from FAO supported seed producers in North 
Kivu. Certified seed—with the oversight of SENASEM—was a requirement for seed sold in all fairs yet the 
SENASEM certification process and protocols are not uniformly applied in DRC. Seed tenders in DRC 
almost universally require certified seed under the authority of SENASEM. This has created a large 
institutional market demand for certified seed that greatly surpasses the market supply of certified seed. 
Reflections 
Seed fair interventions following war and displacement may put a lower priority on encouraging multiple seed 
traders out of a concern for security. However, it is important to recognize that fewer vendors may result in 
less crop and varietal diversity. More market participants can increase the level of competition and encourage 
more diversity in the fairs. Limiting the fairs to seed that is certified and to pre-qualified seed traders may 
create unintended barriers to crops and varietal diversity and exclude existing seed traders and seed producers 
who have good quality locally available seed. The use of ‘emergency seed’ or ‘truthfully labelled seed’ can be 
used as temporary and distinct labels for seed in emergencies where it has been deemed impossible to source 
sufficient amounts of certified seed. This can reduce the phenomenon of poor quality, certified seed which is 
ubiquitous in institutional emergency seed markets where certified seed is a requirement in tendering 
processes yet true certified seed is not available in sufficient quantity. The temporary use of ‘emergency seed’ 
or ‘truthfully labelled seed’ can encourage a more diverse range of seed producers and traders to participate in 
emergency seed markets legally and transparently while also protecting the integrity of certified seed. 
5. Developing a Wheat Seed Private Sector in Afghanistan. 2003 onwards, trigger stress: war- 
rehabilitation 
After more than 20 years of war in Afghanistan, the research and seed production infrastructure for wheat 
collapsed, even though wheat was a priority food crop that accounted for one quarter of agricultural gross 
domestic product in 2014. The FAO developed and oversaw the implementation of three projects from 2003 
to 2013 (programs GCP/AFG/018/EC; GCP/AFG/045/EC; and GCP/AFG/059/EC) that were market 
oriented and helped to establish a private wheat seed sector. There are currently more than 100 private seed 
enterprises11 producing and selling wheat seed, and certified wheat seed production has reached 35,000 metric 
tons annually. 
Through research collaboration with the Agricultural Research Institute of Afghanistan (ARIA), the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and the International Center for 
Agricultural Research in Dryland Areas (ICARDA), higher yielding wheat varieties adapted to Afghanistan 
were identified and introduced using wide scale demonstration trials and field days. Most of the wheat 
varieties were tested in Kenya for UG-9912 rust reaction, all released varieties were resistant to yellow rust and 
had high yielding potential. Within a few years, modern wheat varieties covered almost 60% of the total 
irrigated wheat under production. The projects helped to establish a National Seed Association of 120 private 
seed producers and the National Seed Board (NSB), an umbrella coordination body for seed policy and 
regulation which helped to streamline access to new germplasm and the process for varietal testing and 
release and seed certification. The main buyer of wheat seed produced by the private sector has been other 
aid agency development projects and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). Private 
seed enterprises also sell seed directly to farmers. 
 
11 It is likely that these enterprises are individuals or groups of farmers selling to a parastatal. 
12 UG-99 is a lineage of wheat stem rust (a fungal plant disease) which is particularly virulent and poses a threat to global food 
security. In general, there are three major wheat rust diseases: stem rust, leaf rust, and yellow rust. Yellow rust, also known as 





Where seed systems have been destroyed by years of conflict or neglect, institutional markets are an 
important starting point to re-establish a functioning and responsive seed system. Establishing the 
infrastructure for market-based seed production can take decades to establish but only a couple of years to 
destroy. 
Market-led institutional-based buying alone may not result in increased use of new and modern varieties. 
Varietal trials and demonstrations are necessary—even when institutional sales are driving a seed market—to 
motivate seed demand and farmer adoption of higher yielding and disease tolerant varieties. 
It is important to consider how to transition to more sustainable market-led seed production where farmers 
buy seed directly. Options such as direct seed marketing to farmers at cost recovery prices can expand 
markets, reduce the risk for seed producers, and encourage a transition from centralized institution-based 
seed sales to more decentralized farmer-based seed sales. 
6. Durability of the Informal Sweet Potato Seed Sector in Northern Uganda. 2013-2015, trigger 
stress: long dry season prevents farmers from maintaining vines, periodic insecurity 
(skirmishes). 
This case focuses exclusively on the informal sector in a periodic conflict zone with insecurity spurred by the 
Lord’s Resistance Army. A two-year research study of sweet potato seed systems revealed how the system 
endures in this unstable context and gave insight into the roles of seed producers, seed traders, seed 
transporters, and small-scale seed sellers. Sweet potato vine purchases and sales were monitored among a 
group of local vine multipliers and town vine sellers. This was done regularly during the course of the vine 
selling season of April to August over consecutive years. Information collected included volume and value of 
sales per transaction, price, varieties purchased, location of buyers, and location where vines were to be 
planted. The data revealed frequency of transactions, types of buyers, conditions for purchase and which 
could lead to higher or lower prices, and the varieties in demand. Overall, the work resulted in a strong 
characterization of a well-structured and functioning market for sweet potato vines. The informal focus might 
have strong lessons for elsewhere. 
Vine sales to farmers from local multipliers were mostly to customers in a 10 km radius and prices fluctuated 
as a function of the condition and location of sales. For example, the best average price per bundle of vines 
sold by vine multipliers was under the condition that the vines were packed and delivered to the farm. More 
frequent, but less lucrative, was vine sales in local markets and this required packing, transporting, and the 
risk of not selling. Least remunerative, but lowest risk and effort, was when vine buyers came to the field of 
the vine multiplier. In contrast to the local multipliers selling to local farmers, multipliers working for NGOs 
seemed to suspend normal market-based economic behavior as these multipliers produced and sold at scale 
to NGOs and received a price premium of 60-250% over that of the local vine multipliers. 
Reflections 
The study illustrated the resilience of the existing sweet potato seed sector and more broadly highlighted the 
value of understanding how local systems work before designing market led interventions to improve a seed 
system. To leverage this informal sector requires an effort to understand how it functions, the main actors, 
the services these actors provide, and the constraints and opportunities they face. 
In the Uganda case, the informal seed sector for sweet potato vines is resilient, efficient, and market-oriented 
in providing farmers access to sweet potato vines at a variety of price points. This informal seed sector 
(traders, transporters, producers) is sustainable and warrants more support to promote knowledge and access 
to new varieties and other sweet potato seed system innovations which contribute to food security, nutrition, 




The informal seed system learning led to subsequent projects in Uganda and Tanzania where the focus was 
on working with the informal seed sectors actors and strengthening their collaboration with breeding 
programs to increase the speed at which they accessed new germplasm and to expand the diversity of 
germplasm promoted through informal sweet potato seed systems. 
7. Cooperative-based Seed Production and Marketing of Millet in Niger. 2016-2020, trigger 
stress: drought, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
The Federation of Kishi is a cooperative comprised of more than 11,000 farmers of which more than 7,000 
members are women. Millet is the most important food crop and the basis of the local diet. Farmers generally 
use their own seed for millet production but rely on the market during periods of stress. The region of 
Tahoua where the intervention occurred is vast—more than 40,000 square miles and a population of more 
than two million people. It has faced chronic stress: there were emergency response activities funded from 
2012/2013 following the Sahel food security crisis and in 2017 there were failed rains. The region is relatively 
stable but there is an influx of internally displaced people due to conflict in Northern Nigeria. 
Ten millet seed producers were identified by the cooperative on the basis of having at least one hectare to 
allocate to millet seed production and willingness to apply a technical package as recommended by the Niger 
national research program (INRAN). Over the course of three years, more than 12 MT of millet seed have 
been produced. Production targets are set annually in April / May at the onset of rains. There are no forward 
contracts, but producers, due to being in the cooperative, are confident that they will have a market, whether 
due to localized drought and/or the demand for the new variety provided. Producers follow the production 
steps required for certification, but they are not certified as it is not a legal requirement in Niger for seed that 
circulates within a cooperative. The same variety – HKP – was produced in all seasons and is preferred due 
its early maturity and high yield. The variety was identified by INRAN, and in the first year of the activity 
eight trials were organized across the millet production zone to show the performance of the variety versus 
local varieties. All seed production inputs are provided by the Kishi Union for free to the seed producers, and 
seed is stored centrally at Kishi Federation warehouses. When seed is sold, the input costs are subtracted 
from payments made to the seed producers. In 2017, nearly all of the seed was sold internally to union 
members and some seed was sold through seed fairs organized by NGOs in the region. In 2018, seed was 
purchased from seed producers at .58 USD per kg (350 CFA) and sold at .62 USD per kg (375 CFA). In 
2019, seed was purchased from the seed producers at .62 USD per kg (375 CFA) and sold at .71 USD per kg 
(425 CFA). 
Reflections 
In general, seed production decisions—crop and variety—necessitate regular consultation and feedback with 
the seed producers and the intended seed users. Building linkages between national research partners, 
breeders, seed producers, and farmer organizations / cooperatives is critical to the development, deployment, 
demand, and adoption of varieties which respond to the diverse needs of farmers and markets. 
Seed production decisions within the cooperative were based on consultative discussions with cooperative 
member farmers and seed producers. These consultation discussions regarding production decisions and 
projected farmer seed demand were pragmatic and helpful and may be more likely to occur when there is 
decentralized community- based seed production.  
Producing seed in the cooperative and selling to individual cooperative members can give profit and is 
market-driven but it seems unlikely that the seed producers will keep producing seed if there is not a regular 
infusion of new millet varieties because millet seed is easily produced and managed at farm level. 
8. Building Seed Markets with Agro-dealers and Partial Vouchers in Northern Karamoja 
Region, Uganda; legumes, cereals and vegetable seed. 2012-2017, trigger stress: ongoing 




This program – Growth Health and Governance (GHG) program - was implemented in a semi-arid, 
traditionally pastoralist region where a government-led disarmament process aimed to sedentarize herders and 
promote crop agriculture as a livelihood. The region has received a lot of aid to support this transition. The 
seed activities were intended to increase market demand for a range of certified seed of legumes, cereals and 
vegetables with the overall goal to increase agriculture production and build seed markets in the region. The 
planning premise was that seed markets would develop because the farmers (formerly herders) would become 
used to the high quality and recognize that the seed became less productive when replanted year after year. 
Also, the theory posited, farmers’ accessing and planting seed procured through agro-dealers would 
experience the modern returns and become regular recurrent seed buyers. 
Seed companies in the Ugandan capital were provided credit guarantees worth 60% of the stock they 
provided to agro-dealers. Nine agro-dealers participated and were required to pay 10% of the cost of the seed 
which they stocked, had 90 days to pay for stock or return it to seed companies, and were not aware of the 
credit guarantees to the seed companies. Farmers were provided with vouchers to access the seed that were 
valid on condition that farmer-clients pay 50% of the value of the voucher and redeemed only at the nine 
endorsed agro-dealers.  
In 2017, the GHG program provided vouchers to 19,058 farmers of whom 94% were women. Systematic 
random sampling was carried out in September 2017 among voucher recipients to determine voucher 
redemption rates. The survey revealed that, across the three districts of the program, 31% of voucher 
recipients had redeemed the vouchers they received. The program closed in August 2017. 
Table 2. Vouchers generated and redeemed by GHG program in Karamajong District 2012-2017 
# Vouchers Generated # Vouchers Redeemed % of Vouchers Redeemed 
125,268 38,650 31% 
 
In August 2017, a voucher activity report was generated by the program partner responsible for paying agro-
dealers. The report showed that 35% of the total value of vouchers made available were redeemed. The 
report also indicated that 15,988 legume vouchers, 12,196 cereal vouchers and 9,861 vegetable seed vouchers 
were redeemed. 
Table 3. Value (USD) of vouchers made available and redeemed in Karamajong District 2012-2017 
Value of Vouchers 
made available ($) 
Value of Redeemed 
Vouchers ($) 
Value of Un- Redeemed 
Vouchers ($) 
% of Voucher Value 
Redeemed 
1,803,643 639,448 1,164,195 35% 
 
The five participating seed companies were interviewed at the close of the program to share their perspectives 
and recommendations. All expressed interest to continue to work in the seed markets of the region under the 
condition that agro-dealers pay for the transport of seed, that agro-dealers pay for seed stocks within 60 days, 
and that agro-dealers make down payment on seed stocks (10% for some seed companies and 80% for 
others). All of the seed companies suggested more focus on seed marketing and extension as well as 
supporting farmers to work in groups and cooperatives to make bulk purchases. 
Reflections 
Large credit guarantees to suppliers and extensive subsidies to farmers can strengthen seed market linkages 
and foster the development of formal seed markets in the short term. However, more sustainable market led 
approaches require more investment in marketing and understanding the needs and interests of the consumer 




50% subsidies13. The low redemption rate may be explained by lack of access to money but may also indicate 
that the varieties on offer were not of sufficient interest to the farmers targeted.  
Understanding farmer demand for seed, their interest in specific varieties and their willingness or ability to 
pay is a sine qua non to promote a more sustainable consumer led market-based approach. Market-led seed 
program programs built on hypotheses concerning farmer behavior regarding seed access and use will be 
stronger if the hypotheses are grounded on understanding farmer demand for seed. Smaller voucher values 
and the use of small packs can increase farmer interest in acquiring new and modern varieties but may not 
lead to the purchase of significant volumes of seed sold by seed companies. 
9. Small packs for legumes in drought prone Kenya. 2004 onwards, trigger stress: drought and 
need to address smallholder (poorer) purchase patterns. 
Dryland Seed began operation in 2004 with a focus on legume seed: beans, cowpea, and green gram. They 
have a climate-smart agriculture business model and produce and sell drought tolerant and early maturing 
crops and varieties. Sales are primarily through agro-dealers and they establish demonstration plots and carry 
out field days to market their seed to farmers. Seed is packed in affordable small packs ranging from 100 
grams to one or two kilograms. The 100 gram small packs are provided to farmers during field days and the 
one – two kilogram packs represent the most common units of sales through their agro-dealer networks. 
Individual sales to farmers accounts for less than 10% of Dryland sales. Direct purchase by NGO and 
government programs account for up to 30% of sales, and sales through agro-dealers – which includes agro-
dealers supported by climate smart agricultural programs – accounts for more than 60% of sales. 
Dryland Seed can expand its business through a combination of a sustained growth in legume production, 
licensing new varieties from seed companies, and by having preferential access to new public varieties. Some 
of the challenges Dryland Seed has identified include the high cost and labor intensity of packing seed; 
reluctance of agro-dealers to stock packs under two kilograms; high distribution costs relative to the margins 
they make on seed; presence of counterfeit seed on the market; and tendency of farmers to recycle seed. 
Reflections 
Small packs are a useful market-based approach to help seed companies expand their customer based and 
increase farmer access to seed. Climate smart agriculture is a niche market opportunity for nascent seed 
companies to sell seed into new channels. Demonstration plots, field days, and small packs of seed are a tried 
and true means to introduce farmers to new varieties and sustainably build market demand. 
10. Small packs for bio-fortified legume seed crops in Uganda. 2010 onwards, trigger stress: need 
to decentralize sale in ‘last mile’ communities and to promote biofortified variety options. 
Community Enterprise Development Organization (CEDO) is a member-based agricultural enterprise which 
evolved out of a community-based common bean seed producer. CEDO registered as a seed company in 
2010. Early generation seed is sourced from government structures and produced and sold by contracted 
producer groups in thirty districts of Uganda. Seed production has ranged from approximately 150 to 400 
metric tons annually. Individual farmers account for 60% of seed buyers; agro-input dealers account for 15% 
of buyers; seed processing companies account for 15% of buyers, and NGO and government programs 
account for 10% of buyers. 
 
13 Although the levels of poverty declined slightly during the course of the GHG project, the percentage of people living on less 
than $1.25 per day within the project area was 87 percent in 2018; and the depth of poverty was 53.3 percent (Vondal et al., 2019). 
The project evaluation report states that, by their own admission, the project implementing partner had underestimated the level of 
poverty in Northern Karamoja. Assessments showed that women, who were the principal buyers of seed, given their role as 
cultivators, could not afford the higher costs of modern seeds and could not afford to fail by taking the risk of trying the seeds if 




CEDO has an innovative marketing strategy which consists of the use of small packs and distribution 
through mom & pop village-based shops and village based agents; advertising in media and through market 
days and agricultural fairs; and providing credit for both large and small scale buyers. CEDO is able to 
effectively reach farmers in the last mile with quality seed due to the small-scale packaging, aggressive 
marketing, and promoting diverse seed marketing channels. 
Reflections 
Seed margins are low so it makes sense to develop a number of diverse sales channel and not to rely on 
conventional agro-dealers. Unless there are some subsidies or program support, agro-dealer margins on seed 
alone are often too low for them to justify holding seed stock and tie up working capital. Small packs are a 
useful market-based approach to help seed companies expand their customer based and increase farmer 





COMBINED INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK 
General Overview of Cases 
Using the Market-based Seed Intervention framework (Sperling, 2019), we now characterize the broad market 
support strategy implemented in the set of cases previously described. Which types of markets were being 
supported and, in terms of perceived seed security constraints, where did the humanitarian response choose 
to put the prime support emphasis? There are several broad conclusions which emerge quite strongly (refer to 
table 4). 
Table 4. Market-based Seed Interventions in the Ten Supply-Side Cases Reviewed14 
Seed Security parameter Market-based intervention (supply) 
Formal seed sector Informal seed sector 
Availability #1 Rwanda- govt purchase for free distribution  
#2 Zambia- govt purchase for input programs  
#3 Ethiopia-govt purchase for free distribution 
#4 DRC Gathering of certified seed traders-for fairs  
#5 Afghan-Focus on establishing private sector supply—
companies- and multiplication/testing 
#8 Uganda- credit to agro-dealers (to increase stocks of 
certified seed) 
 
#7 Niger- Cooperatives (example of an integrated sector) focus on multiplication 
and sale to union members 
Access #9 Uganda focus on promoting small packs – legumes 
(drought areas) 
#10 Kenya- focus on promoting small packs (last mile) 
 
Quality 
• Seed Health 
 
 
• Crop, Variety, 
Quality 
(most had some government inspections.)  
#1 Rwanda-govt focus Orange Fleshed Sweet Potato 
#2 Zambia- govt focus legumes (expand from maize) #5 
Afghan- focus on modern variety promotion 
#7 Niger- focus on modern varieties (with technical 
package) 






• Information to 
farmers 
• Feedback from 
farmers 
Two-way information sharing was not a pivotal design 
point for any of the cases.  
 
#8 Uganda – credit to agro-dealers revealed useful 




Informal markets: No case (and no organization) chose to actively support the informal markets. A single 
case studied them (#6 Northern Uganda) which was used to inform subsequent projects in both Uganda and 
 




Tanzania. Also, a single case straddled the informal and formal, i.e. an integrated approach, supporting farmer 
cooperatives in Niger (#7); this approach was possibly linked to the chosen crop of millet which is commonly 
produced in informal channels. The Niger case started with the use of registered varieties sourced from 
research, but the seed produced at the level of the cooperatives was not formally certified. Therefore, the 
lion’s share of market-led cases (with slight exception) strategically elected to support only the formal seed 
systems.15 
Seed Security Feature—Availability: In terms of the seed security features, eight of ten cases had a focus 
on promoting seed availability. These embraced an impressive range of crops: #1 Rwanda-sweet potato; #2 
Zambia Legume Seed-common beans, soybean, and groundnuts; #3 Ethiopia-sweet potato; #4 DRC-maize 
and beans; #5 Afghanistan-wheat; #7 Niger-millet; and #8 Uganda-range of crops at agro-dealers: legumes, 
cereals and vegetables. 
In terms of the availability approach, six of the eight cases promoted some sort of subsidized multiplication, 
whether by NARS, seed producers, private sector companies, or farmer cooperatives, and then elected to give 
the seed produced for free or via voucher programs. The Niger case (#7) is perhaps of note as the seed was 
sold to cooperative members. The Uganda case with agro-dealers (#8) is also to be remarked in that 
implementers gave credit to existing agro-dealers to procure seed by their own means. 
Seed Security Feature—Quality: Both aspects of quality were addressed in the market-led interventions, 
variety quality and seed health per se. 
Variety quality: It is notable that many of the cases focusing on an availability response (N=5) also chose to 
use the occasion to promote modern varieties (sometimes referred to as improved varieties). Again, this was 
done across an array of crops (Orange Fleshed Sweet Potato (OFSP), Legumes, Millets, bio-fortified 
crops/varieties - beans and OFSP). 
Seed health: Interventions around seed health also figured prominently in each case but were a key, 
determinant factor in two particular cases. In the Afghanistan case (#5), screening varieties for tolerance to 
wheat rust was a pivotal aspect of the case—this was seen as a positive advance against stress. In the DRC 
SV+F case (#4) seed certification processes were a base for deciding which providers were allowed to 
contribute to the program. In the DRC case, it might be argued that the certification requirement potentially 
reduced crop and varietal diversity as it excluded from fairs local seed traders and seed producers and only 
beans and maize were made available in fair venues. Note that all cases had some sort of rigorous quality 
screening process, aiming for certified or QDS standards. In only the Niger case were local quality standards 
used and supported, with the cooperatives themselves taking the lead in determining acceptable standards. 
Seed Security Feature—Access: Only two cases programmed specific interventions linked to rendering the 
supply more accessible. They introduced small pack formats to make seeds more affordable for smallholder 
farmers—who then purchased with their own money (#9 Kenya and #10 Uganda). 
Seed Security feature—Information: None of the cases had as its pivotal design point information sharing 
or feedback focused on the supply side. (That said, post-distribution monitoring was a key activity for case #8 
as it revealed useful information regarding farmer redemption rates—i.e., the demand side.)  
Discussion 
The cases cover a range of seed projects aimed at supporting markets and addressing seed security issues in 
emergency or chronic stress environments. Hence, some market-led supply approaches are being 
implemented, even if not at the scale or with the diversity of approaches that were anticipated before this 
review started. It is notable that many of the cases involved creating and restricting seed markets to project-
 
15 A case reported previously (Sperling and McGuire 2010) is worth sharing and seems to be a one-off. In 2002, the NGO CARE 
conducted a SV+F activity in Ethiopia that aimed to shape the supply side through working with traders. To get entrance to the 




supported seed producers or pre-approved suppliers. With availability defined as the focus, subsidized and or 
captured markets were given the prime support. The challenge with such a focus on “captured markets” may 
be three fold: (1) when the project stops the supplier often stops as they may not have been encouraged to 
develop and sell into non-subsidized markets; (2) existing seed market actors, those existing before the project 
funding, may lose market opportunity when project supported seed producers operate in the same market 
area; and, (3) seed practitioners (project holders, donors, and public sector organizations with a mandate 
related to seed) may be less cognizant and oriented to work with the existing market seed actors because 
project funds are oriented to captured markets. 
Interestingly, there seem to be similar and perhaps fundamental gaps in all the cases identified—and which 
might be important to address in future project/program design. In only one case, Uganda, was there an 
explicit discussion, mapping, and diagnosis of the existing (ex-ante) seed system. Such knowledge is critically 
important so as to build on existing systems and not to disrupt or harm them. Second, providing information 
to seed users (often farmers) and receiving information from seed users (again farmers) was not explicitly 
planned as an essential core element: i.e. the information education and communication strategy of seed was 
perhaps weaker than warranted and perhaps did not build in adequate accountability to affected populations 
as related to seed. 
Case-specific seed security mapping (across all features, prime and secondary) 
To allow further visibility of results, see mapping below of select cases—providing more detailed seed 
security parameter analysis. Simply, the review aims to illustrate that the seed security framework can be a 
useful tool for moving forward specific program design and reflection. (Cases were chosen to suggest the 
range. See Annex I for further details on all 10 cases). 




Formal Seed Sector Informal Seed Sector 
Availability Supply contract for vine multipliers encourages annual 
production. 
 
Access Cuttings are transported to locations and disseminated to 
farmers (free?). 
 
Quality Procurement process and mixing of varieties are 
reported as on-going challenges. 
 
Information No feedback system from male and female farmers to 
seed producers. No farmer demand methods/tools used 
to help producers assess farmer demand. 
 
 
2. Legume Seed Grower Association selling into Zambia through the government-sponsored Input 




Formal Seed Sector Informal Seed Sector 
Availability Seed legume production based on previous year’s sales, 
mostly to institutional buyers. 
 
Access Seed is purchased and transported to Lusaka, packaged 
and warehoused, and disseminated through two 
government programs. 
 
Quality Seed is inspected by SCCI.  
Information No feedback system from farmers to seed producers. 
No farmer demand methods/tools used to help 






4. Certified Seed Fairs in the Complex Humanitarian Crisis of Eastern DRC. 2017-2019, trigger 




Formal Seed Sector Informal Seed Sector 
Availability Seed traders are selected to participate in seed fairs and 
encouraged to procure seed from project supported 
seed producers. 
 
Access Many fairs were a modified form of direct distribution, 
not allowing the farmer to decide on the crop, variety 
and volume of seed. 
 
Quality Low crop and varietal diversity.  
Information Post seed fair evaluation among participating 
farmers identifies opportunities for improvement. 
Pre-fair assessments could be made more explicit to 
identify crops and varieties most demanded by 
farmers served by the fairs. 
 
 





Formal Seed Sector Informal Seed Sector 
Availability Production was done by seed producers affiliated with the cooperative and 
most of the seed produced was sold to the cooperative members. 
 
Production decision – crop / variety – was determined based on discussion with 
community-based organizations. 
Access Sales were made to individual farmers through the cooperative. 
Quality In Niger, no state-mandated quality 
control, but cooperatives themselves took 
the lead in determining acceptable local 
quality standards. 
Modern varieties with technical 
package 
Information   
 
8. Building Seed Markets with Agro-dealers and Partial Vouchers in Northern Karamoja Region, 
Uganda; legumes, cereals and vegetable seed. 2012-2017, trigger stress: ongoing conflict resulting in 
market disruption and population displacement, recurring drought. 
Seed Security Parameter Market-based Intervention 
Formal Seed Sector Informal Seed Sector 
Availability Credit for commercial seed producers and 
agro-dealers. 
 
Access  E-vouchers at a 50% subsidy redeemed 
through agro- dealers. 
  
Quality Commercial seed was assumed to meet 
quality standards. 
  






9. Small packs for legumes in drought prone Kenya. 2004 onwards, trigger stress: drought and need 
to address smallholder (poorer) purchase patterns.16 
Seed Security Parameter Market-based Intervention 
Formal Seed Sector Informal Seed Sector 
Availability Private company- produces their own seed   
Access Packing in small sizes to make seed more affordable   
Quality Certified seed- including many legumes  
Information Demonstrations, etc.   
  
 





Enabling features for market-led seed work 
In terms of market-led support on the supply side, the review found a good number of cases focusing on 
formal sector market support and especially on ensuring availability, often of modern varieties. Seed suppliers 
of varied types were contracted to produce seed—which was subsequently bought back by governments or 
NGOs and then given free to farmers. This occurred especially in contexts deemed as chronically seed 
insecure, and this practice (“contract multiplication,” buy back - give free) was frequently repetitive, for two 
or three consecutive years or more. A variant of formal sector market support involved giving credit to agro-
dealers who themselves then procured and sold seed directly (albeit with partial subsidy, via vouchers). This 
variant had elements of sustainability and linking relief to development in that a customer base directly 
interfaced with the market (agro-dealer) provider. 
Market led support initiatives on the supply side, oriented to the informal seed sector, are more unknown. 
This review could not document a single in-depth case, although there were anecdotes of donors giving 
grants to support informal traders to improve the quality of their seed in emergency and normal periods. Seed 
traders (or seed/grain traders, as they deal in both commodities) are often portrayed negatively, but they can 
be highly innovative in linking diverse markets, responding to farmers’ local needs, and functioning over years 
even in remote and conflict-ridden environments (Sperling and McGuire, 2010). Specific suggestions for 
improving local seed supply and particularly supporting local seed traders and seed sellers have been 
suggested for decades (see Thiele, 2003; McGuire and Sperling, 2008). Seed/grain traders can potentially 
bolster all aspects of farmers’ seed security to help with seed availability, access, quality and information in 
acute and chronic stress contexts. An easy entry point might be with small packs of certified seed—until the 
regulatory environment becomes more flexible so as to respond to farmers’ real sowing conditions.17 
As precursors to moving forward and expanding market-led support intervention around seed security, it 
seems a priority to understand seed market functioning better in stress periods, both formal and informal 
seed sectors. Such detailed market analysis might be a challenge to carry out in the context of an emergency 
response where there may be time and/or security constraints—both of which can hinder efforts to identify, 
describe, and map out existing market players and assess how the emergency has impacted the market and 
market players. That said, tools do exist to address this gap e.g. The Seed System Security Assessment (SSSA) 
or the Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA), or a combination of the two (see Sperling, 2008 and 
Bryne et al., 2013). They are quick, they do require some expertise, and unfortunately, they are rarely used. 
Note that market analysis of the demand (farmer) side as well as supply side needs to be promoted. What do 
farmers want and need in stress periods? What are they willing to pay for? Which types of farmer are buying 
and under what conditions? (see Almekinders et al., 2019). 
A second precursor is to build in much more learning around what actually is being tested and implemented. 
While the authors of this exploratory review are very grateful for the cases identified and the information and 
insights generously shared, both donors and implementors could have benefitted from more documentation 
of the actual process, the immediate results, and the potential medium-term impact-- linking such relief to 
development. Market-led support, by nature, should have spinoff effects and more enduring impacts. As 
suggestions, program monitoring and evaluation could be oriented to assessing market-based outcomes like 
crop and varietal diversity, farmer choice, competition among seed market participants, and expanding a 
sustainable customer base. 
Practically, on the ground, there is a good deal more work to do in testing and refining market-led support 
approaches focusing on supply. Table 1 brainstormed on a large range of possible seed supply-linked support 
options (refer to Table 1), but the review ultimately could find few of these that had been implemented (and 
 
17 We note that a growing number of countries, especially in Africa, do have QDS standards (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia) as 
well as emergency seed clauses (e.g. Kenya, Zimbabwe) which allow for a wider range of seed qualities to be procured and sold 




please do alert us to any and all cases we may have missed). Both donors and implementors might best 
become more pioneering here—especially going beyond availability support. 
In closing, we list below a first set of enabling features for framing further market-led seed security work. All 
seem essential to every type of seed security market-led intervention. 
Enabling Features for Modern Market Led Interventions in Emergency and Chronic Stress 
Environments 
1. Understand local market functioning—both formal and informal markets. This includes 
mapping the different actors such as producers, small traders, transporters, large traders and 
identifying how they address seed access, availability, and seed quality. 
2. Focus not only on seed availability but on understanding market demand and developing a 
conscious market strategy to sell seed based on male and female farmer demand. 
3. Promote clear and simple gender-sensitive feedback loops from the seed buyer to the seed 
producer and the seed trader. Establish an information and communication system and activities 
which help integrated feedback loops in the seed value chain and place the emphasis on existing 
seed value chain actors, i.e. those that will be present after the program stops. 
4. Ensure that the outcome of the market-led intervention is not a restricted market of less 
participants (few traders or seed sellers) and lower crop and varietal diversity but rather an 
expanded market of more crops and varieties—adapted to stresses faced by farmers. 
5. Devise clear strategies that link relief to development—what happens after the institutional 
buying stops? How to engage with existing informal seed sector actors? 
 
For feedback, including suggesting other cases to move forward learning, contact Stephen Walsh 
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Annex 1. Catalogue of Case Studies 
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 
Intervention Features Immediate 
Recommendations 
Future Research 
1. Rwanda (sweet 
potato) 
GoR buys from 























Government tender processes lead to intermediaries 
and not vine multipliers directly. Tender processes are 
not always put in the public domain; payment to vine 
producers often delayed, seed inspection and vine 
quality is not rigorously followed. 
 
Approximately 70% of all vines are sold on a 
commissioned / contractual basis and 30% through 
spot markets. About 30% of vine production sold is to 
farmers, varying considerably by vine multiplier. Vine 
marketing strategies started in 2014 and include 
innovative strategies like selling at roadside markets, 
advertising with road signposts, organizing vine 
multiplier forums, advertising on radio or tv, and 
building linkages with NGOs involved in root 
production and nutrition activities.  
 
GOR became an important vine buyer since 2017, 
buying at least once per year and distributing to 
vulnerable farmers. Seed (vine) multiplication sites are 
inspected under the authority of the NARS, RAB. 
Many NGO’s request CIP to give certificates to 
decentralized vine multipliers (DVM) to encourage 
their professionalism. Vines are not classified into 
categories. The main seed quality issues addressed by 
this program include poor quality vines used by 
farmers, varietal degeneration, poor resistance to pest 
& disease, and lack of vine conservation strategies.  
Revise the procurement 
process to better integrate 
farmer demand for specific 




contacts and competition 
among seed producers; 
encourage choice for 
farmers in terms of 
varieties and suppliers; 
encourage use of 
diagnostics to understand 
farmer demand. 
Post-distribution 
monitoring to understand 
how farmers experience 
the program, the impact 
on the farmer, and farmer 
willingness to pay so as to 
increase sales of vines 
directly to farmers. 
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 






soya, groundnut)  
Working with a 
seed grower 
association to 
access to new 
varieties, early 
generation seed, 














MT of legume 
seed in 2018, 
comprised of 
40 producers 
in one district, 
they are one of 
the more  
Self Help Africa; 
local seed 
businesses; 




started out in 
2010 under a  
Seed is almost exclusively sold to a single buyer who 
conditions and sells to the government. They have not 
registered any sales to farmers in the district. 
 
Sanikuno has followed a similar model since 2010 
under two different programs and donors. Seed 
inspection is conducted by SCCI (national seed 
inspection service) and Sanikuno has failed inspection 
in several years and as a result has lobbied to have seed  
More diversified sales 
channels for seed 
producers and more sales 
to individual farmers and 
into the community and 
catchment area where the 
seed is produced. 
 
Use of small packs as a  
Identify ways to 
strengthen the sales 
between the seed 
producers and the 
community / catchment 
areas where the seed 
produced; look for 
innovations which can 




 These interventions 




























inspections and certificates issued to individual farmers 
as opposed to the overall association. Seed that fails 
inspection is sold to local traders. 
 
Sanikuno has a good relationship with the national 
agricultural research program, has participated variety 
trials with the legume program, and remains in close 
contact with the head of the national legume program. 
marketing tool to 
encourage farmer access to 
seed and to new varieties 
 
Support / subsidies for 
small replicated demos of 
legume varieties. 
community based seed 
producer markets and 
reduce the role of large 
government or project 
backed aggregators . 
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 
Intervention Features Immediate 
Recommendations 
Future Research 
3. Ethiopia (sweet 
potato, potato) 
[e.g. QDS seed] 















and seed storage 
method for potato 
(diffused light 











cereal based diets 
with potato and 
sweet potato. 
Financial 
scope to be 
determined, up 













in the respective 
regions. 
For both potato and sweet potato, quality declared 
planting material is purchased from quality declared 
seed producers. The main difference is that for potato 
the seed producer cooperatives supply the planting 
material while, for sweet potato, the vines are produced 
by commercial farmers and vine cuttings are 
transported carefully and planted within 2-3 days.  
 
Seed is procured through an open and transparent 
bidding process among existing producers, each bidder 
must have a cooperative registration certificate, an 
annually updated quarantine license, and a bank 
account. Bids are analyzed by committee and fields are 
inspected. The supply contracts are signed by CIP and 
suppliers.  
 
During the most recent season, the emergency project 
purchased 97,000 USD in seed potato and 102,000 
USD for sweet potato vines. No pre-financing is 
provided but seed producers receive training on seed 
production and management. Project staff inspect 
fields to ensure they are disease- free and to estimate 
plant material quantities. All project seed fields and 
stores are inspected by the Input Control and 
Quarantine Office of the Regulatory Department in the 
MoA. All seed which passes inspection is called QDS. 
Over 90% of all seed produced by this program is 
purchased by institutions and projects. 
 
The Bureau of Agriculture oversees the field 
inspections and monitors implementation of QDS 
regulations. QDS standards have been employed for 
potato and sweet potato since 2011/2012 and were 
endorsed by the government since 2015 for potato and 
since 2016 for sweet potato. 
Public access data base / 
centralized data 
management of all seed 
produced by location, 
varieties, source material, 
planting date, and intended 
harvest date. 
 
Farm and community level 
diagnostic assessments to 
characterize potato and 
sweet potato seed systems 
and qualify / quantify 
farmer demand for potato 
and sweet potato. 
Post-distribution 
monitoring to understand 
how farmers experience 
the program, the impact 
on the farmers accessing 
planting material, and 
farmer willingness to pay 
for planting material so 
that sales can be 





Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 
Intervention Features Immediate 
Recommendations 
Future Research 
4. DRC (beans, 
maize) 































Seed traders were selected following a tender 
process which was overseen by the national seed 
inspectorate (SENASEM), only certified seed was 
allowed at the fair. Limited crop and varietal diversity. 
 
For FAO-supported seed fairs, the seed sellers were 
encouraged to source seed from FAO-supported seed 
producers. 
 
Two of the three fairs were organized as modified 
distributions whereby each household was allocated a 
fixed amount of seed in exchange for a voucher. 
 
A limited number of traders /seed sellers participated 
in the fairs. Few seed producers participated directly in 
the fairs. 
Farm and community level 
diagnostic assessments to 
characterize seed systems 
and qualify / quantify 
farmer demand for seed. 
 
Encourage farmer choice 
and local seed producers 
and local traders by 
allowing them to bring seed 
to seed fairs. 
 
Expand the number of 
sellers at the fairs and 
encourage seed producers 
to sell directly at fairs. 
Introduce a new seed class 
‘emergency seed’ to 
reduce the motivation of 
seed practitioners (donors, 
projects, seed producers) 
to only seek certified seed 
as the current practice. 
This practice blocks 
quality seed from informal 
markets/producers to be 
transparently sold, instead 
creating an artificial 
market for certified seed 
which cannot be met. One 
result is that ‘informal 
seed’ is sometimes sold 
without transparency as 
‘certified’. 
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 








grants / market 
linkages. 
Emergency/post-
war following two 
decades of 
conflict and seed 
infrastructure 
collapse and 
varieties that were 
screened for 
tolerance to 
wheat rust (UG- 
99). 
Country wide 

















Variety testing and screening in Kenya for UG-99 to 
identify high yielding varieties with resistance to yellow 
rust. Field demonstrations and on- farm trials were an 
important component to promote the modern wheat 
varieties. Main buyers of seed included aid agencies, 
Ministry of Agriculture but nearby seed producers also 
sold some production directly to farmers. Modern 
wheat seed covers more than 60% of irrigated wheat 
production in Afghanistan and certified wheat seed 
production has reached 35,000 metric tons annually.  
Seed production and sales 
was stimulated by 
institutional purchases 
(projects) and the threat of 
wheat rust, to sustain a 
more market oriented and 
farmer driven wheat seed 
market will require greater 
decentralization and more 
emphasis on varietal 
demonstrations. 
Improve seed marketing 
directly to farmers and 
increase the cost recovery 
from subsidies to wheat 
seed producers. 
 
Identify lower cost 
options for promoting 
farmer access to varietal 
diversification. 
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 
Intervention Features Immediate Recommendations 





seed potato vine 




Long dry season 
precludes farmers 
from saving seed/ 
vines, there is a 
recurrent market 










Existing seed sector was mapped in the region and a 
subset of participants (producers, traders, transporters) 
were interviewed over several seasons to understand 
their respective role in the local seed system. Two 
follow on interventions were funded as a result of this 
work, both focused on increasing linkages between 
breeders and the local sweet potato seed system actors 
in order to promote access to more varieties and to 
strengthen feed-back loops between existing seed 
system actors and breeding programs. 
Interventions (like this) should occur with recognition of 
the informal / existing actors working in same system. 
 
Support Farm and community level diagnostic 
assessments to characterize seed systems and qualify / 





Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 
Intervention Features Immediate 
Recommendations 
Future Research 
7. Niger (millet) Seed producers are 
supported with 
training, foundation 






security crisis and 
207 failed rains. 
Six seed 
producers; 
























Varieties are identified by the national research 
program. 
 
Production targets are set at the start of the planting 
season based on discussion within the federation with 
seed producers and farmers; this includes production 
targets and prices. 
 
No contracts are signed. 
 
Agricultural technical services of Nigeria monitors seed 
production through seed field visits but the seed is not 
formally certified. 
Need farm and community 
level diagnostic 
assessments to characterize 
seed systems and qualify / 
quantify farmer demand for 
seed. 
Devise exit strategy; 
(which is not evident). 
How does this 
intervention support 
sustainability of the 
system? 
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 






at registered agro- 
dealers and credit 
provided to seed 
producers and 
agro-dealers. 
Chronic stress 18,000 E-vouchers redeemed in 
2016. Farmers bought nearly 
14,000 metric tons of legume seed 
and 2,500 metric tons of cereal 
seed. 
a. What were the seed quality issues which were alluded to, but not discussed in any detail, in the program 
evaluation? b. The 50/50 scratch cards: Were there any issues convincing farmers to pay the 50%?  Were all scratch 
cards purchased? How was the collection aspect administered? Any data on the demographic of farmers that paid 
the 50%? c. Credit supply guarantees: How were these administered? How many guarantees were provided and what 
was the typical value? d. E-Voucher purchase data: Did the purchase data include information by crop, variety, and 
agro- dealer? Were there any operational issues to get this data? e. Follow up with Seed producers / Agro- dealers: 
Did the program include exit strategy activities for the seed producers and agro-dealers supported by the program? 
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 






Small packs used in 
drought 
context. 
Chronic Stress  
Country & Crop Market 
Intervention 
Context Scope Project 
Partners 





Small packs used 
for bio-fortified 
crops. 
Chronic stress  
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Annex 2. Sources for the Cases 
Case Study 1: Rwanda Sweet Potato 
Personal correspondence with program manager Sindi Kirimi, CIP Rwanda in September – October 2019. 
Case Study 2: Zambia Legumes 
Field visit, trip notes, and personal correspondence with seed producer group under a program review to 
assess how NGO seed activities can be more supportive of seed business development in October 2018 and 
April 2019. 
Case Study 3: Ethiopia Sweet Potato and Potato 
Personal correspondence with program manager Berga Lemaga, CIP Ethiopia in September – October 2019. 
Case Study 4: DR Congo 
Personal communication with Paul Muhasa, CEDERU director in September – October 2019.  
Field visit with CEDERU in Goma, DRC on Sunday July 21, 2019. 
Un-published internal program document (2019) summarizing lessons learned from several seed voucher and 
fair experiences led by CEDERU in Eastern DRC in 2017 and 2018. 
Case Study 5: Afghanistan 
Personal communication with Ahmad Zia Aria, FAO Afghanistan in October 2019. 
Afghanistan and FAO Achievements and success stories (2011); FAO Afghanistan Seed Program Summary 
of Achievements (2015). 
Case Study 6: Uganda Informal Seed Systems 
Rachkara, P. et al. (2017). Innovative and beneficial informal sweet potato seed private enterprise in northern 
Uganda. Food Security 9. pp. 595-610. 
Case Study 7: Niger Millet 
Millet in Niger case study – Personal communication with LWR staff Kouka Zoungana, Bijou Kuzimbu, and 
Nana Aminata Toure in West Africa, and Niger in September – October 2019. 
Case Study 8: Uganda Vouchers 
Personal correspondence with Mercy Corps staff Sylvia Alaso, Fredrick Mpaata, Iveta Ouvry in September-
October 2019.  
Uganda case study – Final Performance Evaluation of Northern Karamoja Growth, Health, and Governance 
Development Food Assistance Project (January 2019). 
Seeds E-voucher: An Approach to Inclusive Agri-Market Development; The TOPS Agriculture and Natural 
Resource Management Case Study Series (October 2016). 
Un-published program documentation (2019) related to voucher activity reports for multiple programs, un-
published document on random sample of seed voucher program participants to assess use of vouchers. 
Case Study 9: Kenya Small Packs 
Kenya case study on small packs – power point presentation of Dryland Seed, small packs and climate smart 
(March 2017), Formal meeting proceedings; https://seedsystem.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/New-
Models-for-Legume-Seed-Business_meeting-report_FINAL-FINAL.pdf  
Case Study 10: Uganda Small Packs 
Uganda case study on small packs – power point presentation of CEDO, small pack and seed credit model 
(March 2017). Formal meeting proceedings. https://seedsystem.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/New-
Models-for-Legume-Seed-Business_meeting-report_FINAL-FINAL.pdf  
